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PUTTING ACCESSIBLE EXPRESSION TO BED 
Jamila A. Odeh* 
In 2011, the Occupy movement began. Occupiers seized space in dozens of 
public parks and in the American imagination, providing a compelling illus-
tration of an inclusive format of political expression. In the courtroom, pro-
testers sought injunctive relief on First Amendment grounds to protect the 
tent encampments where Occupiers slept. In 2017, the last of the Occupy liti-
gation ended; but the ramifications the Occupy cases hold for the First 
Amendment and expressive conduct remain unexamined. 
This Comment takes an in-depth look at the adjudication of Occupiers’ First 
Amendment interest in sleeping in public parks. It analyzes the adjudication 
of the Occupy cases and contends that the pattern of judicial enforcement re-
sults from a desire to remove the appearance of disorder associated with 
houselessness. This Comment argues that the test used to set the scrutiny level 
for First Amendment expressive activity systematically disadvantages speech 
by and about houseless persons. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is illegal to be houseless1 and unsheltered in most American cities.2 In 
late 2010, two parents and their three children in Wenatchee, Washington, 
believed that their period of houselessness was nearly over.3 After a year 
without housing, they were finally closing a lease. Late at night—long after 
public restrooms closed—the father was arrested for public urination.4 Be-
cause of that arrest, the family missed its appointment with an apartment 
manager the next morning, and the opportunity vanished.5 
The law against public urination that stymied the family’s hopes for 
housing is part of a larger body of laws called “broken windows” policies.6 
These policies began three decades earlier in New York City, and a cascade 
of similar ordinances quickly swept across America.7 In 2011, the family of 
 
 1. This Comment uses the term “houseless” and not “homeless,” because it more accu-
rately describes a broader population of people experiencing housing insecurity, and it does 
not imply the experience is an immutable characteristic. 
 2. Don Mitchell, Anti-Homeless Laws and Public Space: I. Begging and the First 
Amendment, 19 URB. GEOGRAPHY 6 (1998); Don Mitchell, Anti-Homeless Laws and Public 
Space: II. Further Constitutional Issues, 19 URB. GEOGRAPHY 98 (1998); NAT’L LAW CTR. ON 
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 10, 52–71 (2016), https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Housing-
Not-Handcuffs (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 3. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, CRIMINALIZING CRISIS: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 33–34 (2011) [hereinafter CRIMINALIZING 
CRISIS], https://www.nlchp.org/documents/Criminalizing_Crisis [https://perma.cc/3U73-
KEYH]. 
 4. Id. at 34. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Broken windows policies prioritize the strict application of petty crime laws in an 
effort to prevent serious criminal activity. They often include the expansion of criminal law for 
petty crimes like vandalism, loitering, and panhandling and take a zero-tolerance approach to 
enforcement. See Eric Klinenberg, The Other Side of “Broken Windows,” NEW YORKER (Aug. 
23, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/the-other-side-of-broken-windows 
[https://perma.cc/T2XD-AVYD]. 
 7. Ngozi C. Kamalu & Emmanuel C. Onyeozili, A Critical Analysis of the ‘Broken Win-
dows’ Policing in New York City and Its Impact: Implications for the Criminal Justice System 
and the African American Community, 11 AFR. J. CRIMINOLOGY & JUST. STUD. 71, 72 (2018); 
Klinenberg, supra note 6; see infra Section I.A. The “broken windows” label came from an in-
fluential article by George Kelling and James Wilson that “used the analogy that a broken win-
dow, left unattended, would signal that no one cared and ultimately lead to more disorder and 
even crime.” Sarah Childress, The Problem with “Broken Windows” Policing, FRONTLINE (June 
28, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-problem-with-broken-windows-
policing/ [https://perma.cc/Q53B-9WE9]. 
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five from Wenatchee remained houseless.8 The criminalization of living un-
sheltered made housing unattainable. That same year, Occupy Wall Street 
began9 and quickly spread across America.10 
Occupy’s key feature, twenty-four-hour protests in tent encampments, 
had its roots in tent communities set up by houseless people.11 But as police 
worked to disperse the protesters, Occupiers learned what houseless people 
knew all along, that “biologically necessary activities are illegal when per-
formed in American streets—not just peeing, but sitting, lying down and 
sleeping.”12 One houseless-outreach worker explained: “The city will not tol-
erate a tent city. . . . The camps have to be out of sight.”13 Yet visibility for the 
encampments was the protesters’ explicit goal.14 
Occupy put a national spotlight on the criminalization of public sleeping 
when several Occupy groups challenged anti-sleeping ordinances on First 
Amendment grounds.15 Because sleeping in the encampments was an activi-
ty potent with political meaning, it was ostensibly protected by the First 
Amendment. But the anti-sleeping laws made this core aspect of Occupy’s 
expression illegal.16 Occupiers sought injunctions to cease enforcement of 
anti-sleeping ordinances. The courts, however, applied tests for content-
neutral regulations and held that the sleeping restrictions were valid.17 
 
 8. CRIMINALIZING CRISIS, supra note 3, at 34. 
 9. Oleg Komlik, The Original Email that Started Occupy Wall Street, ECON. SOC. & 
POL. ECON. (Dec. 27, 2014), https://economicsociology.org/2014/12/27/the-original-email-
that-started-occupy-wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/7NGR-GYWB]; see Martin Kaste, Exploring 
Occupy Wall Street’s ‘Adbuster’ Origins, NPR (Oct. 20, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2011/10/20/141526467/exploring-occupy-wall-streets-adbuster-origins [https://perma.cc/
A9F9-E5SF]. 
 10. ‘Occupy Wall Street’ Protests Spread Across the Country, ABC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2011), 
https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/10/occupy-wall-street-protests-spread-across-
the-country-bloomberg-calls-them-misguided [http://perma.cc/7LKY-T343]; Michael Levitin, 
The Triumph of Occupy Wall Street, ATLANTIC (Jun. 10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2015/06/the-triumph-of-occupy-wall-street/395408/ [https://perma.cc/H7KE-
ZBGT]. 
 11. Barbara Ehrenreich, Occupy Wall Street Brings Homelessness into the Open, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2011, 12:45 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
cifamerica/2011/oct/24/occupy-wall-street-homelessness-us [https://perma.cc/G9S8-8Q37] 
(“[T]ent cities are the domestic progenitors of the American occupation movement.”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Jen Schradie, Why Tents (Still) Matter for the Occupy Movement, COMMON 
DREAMS (Nov. 24, 2011), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2011/11/24/why-tents-still-
matter-occupy-movement [https://perma.cc/C5UB-A7XK] (discussing the symbolic and polit-
ical significance of visible tents to Occupy’s cause). 
 15. See, e.g., Eyder Peralta, The Occupy Movement and the First Amendment: ‘A Classic 
Collision,’ NPR (Nov. 15, 2011, 1:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2011/
11/15/142348726/the-occupy-movement-and-the-first-amendment-a-classic-collision [https://
perma.cc/GR6S-TDKY]. 
 16. See infra notes 227–235 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra Section I.B. 
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This Comment argues that the use of content-neutral and content-based 
analysis for expressive conduct facilitates the systematic exclusion of expres-
sion by and about houseless people. Part I explains the development of anti-
sleeping ordinances and jurisprudence on expressive conduct. Part II assess-
es the Occupy First Amendment challenges. Part III contends that when 
courts afford less scrutiny for content-neutral restrictions on expressive con-
duct, they also condone removing the appearance of houselessness from 
public spaces. Ultimately, the Occupy cases illustrate a more pervasive issue: 
courts have undermined the accessibility of expressive conduct in the public 
forum for all Americans. 
I. THE ANTI-SLEEPING ORDINANCE AND EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT 
Criminal laws prohibiting sleeping in public and First Amendment ju-
risprudence on expressive activity converge in the public parks of American 
cities. Section I.A highlights criminal anti-sleeping laws. Section I.B explores 
First Amendment jurisprudence on sleeping as an expressive activity. 
A. The Criminal Prohibition on Sleeping 
Policing public space in a city to force houseless people elsewhere is a 
common way to make unsheltered people another city’s problem.18 Many 
ordinances criminalize sleeping in public,19 even though most houseless 
people cannot find shelter indoors.20 Therefore, compliance with anti-
sleeping laws is effectively impossible for most houseless people.21 
Discriminatory enforcement is well documented.22 Police cannot find 
and remove everyone who sleeps in public, so seeking out people who look 
houseless is an easier,23 more enforceable approach.24 Moreover, policing 
 
 18. Marc L. Roark, Homelessness at the Cathedral, 80 MO. L. REV. 53, 76 nn.121–22, 110 
(2015). 
 19. Id. at 81 (“Cities regularly enact ordinances aimed at preventing homeless persons 
from sleeping in public spaces.”); Bryce Covert, When Trying to Survive While Homeless Is 
Made Illegal, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 17, 2016, 1:01 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/
criminalization-homelessness-908918d0a46/ [https://perma.cc/UET7-D2TT] (“Today, a third 
of the country’s cities ban camping in public, nearly one in five ban sleeping in public . . . .”); 
see NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS & NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, A 
DREAM DENIED: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 16–17, 24–78 (2006), 
https://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MMD5-9WZ8] (providing narratives of cities with measures that criminalize 
homelessness, many including sleeping bans). 
 20. Sara K. Rankin, The Influence of Exile, 76 MD. L. REV. 4, 43 (2016) (“[T]he majority 
of homeless people are forced to live in public.”). 
 21. See Randall Amster, Patterns of Exclusion: Sanitizing Space, Criminalizing Home-
lessness, 30 SOC. JUST., no. 1, 2003, at 195. 
 22. See id. at 208; see also Alafair Burke, Policing, Protestors, and Discretion, 40 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999, 1002–05 (2013). 
 23. See Jessica Gerrard & David Farrugia, The ‘Lamentable Sight’ of Homelessness and 
the Society of the Spectacle, 52 URB. STUD. 2219, 2223–24 (2015); David M. Smith, Note, A The-
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appearance is an overt goal in many cities.25 Broken windows policies pro-
mote “the idea that eliminating visible signs of disorder deters more serious 
crime.”26 They stigmatize houseless people as a visible sign of danger.27 But 
the threat is only “one of perception.”28 An increased houseless population 
does not necessarily correspond to a rise in crime.29 More importantly, the 
policies dehumanize people by viewing them as problems.30 
B.  Expressive Conduct Jurisprudence 
The First Amendment protects forms of expression beyond written and 
spoken words.31 Conduct, including sleeping, can be communicative.32 
Sleeping is a particularly difficult form of expression to adjudicate, because it 
is “a nonexpressive everyday function, yet it may also be performed for 
communicative reasons.”33 
The threshold question is whether conduct is sufficiently expressive for 
First Amendment protection.34 The Supreme Court created a two-prong test 
for the inquiry. First, was the conduct “intended to be communicative”?35 
Second, would the conduct “in context . . . be understood by the viewer to be 
 
oretical and Legal Challenge to Homeless Criminalization as Public Policy, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 487, 496–97 (1994). 
 24. See Amster, supra note 21, at 197, 208–09 & 216 n.10. 
 25. Id. at 201 (“[S]ome cities state expressly that their intention is to . . . . remove home-
less people from particular places, such as parks, streets or downtown areas. . . . Some target the 
‘visible’ homeless with the goal of making them ‘invisible.’ ” (quoting Maria Foscarinis, Down-
ward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminalization, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV., no. 1, 1996, at 1, 
22–23)). 
 26. Roark, supra note 18, at 73–74 (“[P]roponents of the broken window hypothesis 
often point to homelessness as a precursor to greater criminal tendencies for an area.”). 
 27. See id. at 81. See generally Gerrard & Farrugia, supra note 23, at 2221 (analyzing how 
onlookers visually interpret images of homeless people). 
 28. Amster, supra note 21, at 196 (emphasis omitted). 
 29. See id. at 209; Roark, supra note 18, at 80–82; Smith, supra note 23, at 496. 
 30. See Amster, supra note 21, at 207–09; Roark, supra note 18, at 80–82. 
 31. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 
(1995). 
 32. See Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1327–28 (M.D. 
Fla. 2011) (recognizing sleeping in public as protected under the First Amendment in the con-
text of Occupy Fort Myers); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503 (1969); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 
(1931). 
 33. Laurie Magid, Note, First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. 
L. REV. 467, 467 (1984). 
 34. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974); see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984). 
 35. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294. 
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communicative”?36 If a plaintiff cannot meet the two-prong test, there is no 
claim.37 If the plaintiff meets both prongs, the Constitution limits the gov-
ernment’s ability to restrict the expression. The Court uses a balancing test 
to assess whether the governmental restriction is valid.38 
There are a few iterations of the balancing test that may apply depending 
on the nature of the government’s restriction.39 The first time the Court ar-
ticulated a balancing test in the context of expressive conduct was in 1968, in 
United States v. O’Brien.40 The case involved a Vietnam War dissenter who 
was convicted for intentionally burning his draft card before a large crowd.41 
But the relevant statute targeted his conduct, not his message.42 Further, the 
government interest—the administrative ease of raising armed forces—was 
“unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”43 The Court propounded a 
test that applies when a restriction on speech is incidental, rather than in-
tended to suppress speech.44 The restriction is permissible “if it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest . . . and if the incidental re-
striction . . . is no greater than is essential45 to the furtherance of that inter-
est.”46 In effect, the Court created a balancing test in which an important 
governmental interest may outweigh incidental restrictions on speech.47 
Over a decade after O’Brien, the Court articulated a second balancing 
test. The time, place, or manner (TPM) test also covers expressive conduct in 
some instances when the regulation is content neutral.48 This test applies 
when a content-neutral regulation limits the time, the place, or the man-
 
 36. Id. An early iteration of the test also required a particularized message, but the Court 
abandoned that criterion, allowing greater flexibility. Compare Spence, 418 U.S. at 409–11, with 
Clark, 468 U.S. at 294. 
 37. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 294. 
 38. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Clark, 468 U.S. 288; United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 39. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412; Clark, 468 U.S. at 294; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77. 
 40. See 391 U.S. at 376–77; Claire Howard, A New First Amendment Battleground: Chal-
lenges Facing Local Governments by the Occupy Movement and Proactive Responses to Future 
Movements, 45 URB. LAW. 473, 480 (2013). 
 41. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 369. 
 42. Id. at 375. 
 43. Id. at 377. 
 44. Id. at 376. 
 45. “[N]o greater than is essential” was later interpreted as a balancing test only. United 
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688–89 (1985) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). 
 46. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 47. Christine Verbitsky, The Occupy Wall Street Movement and the Constitution: Pro-
testers Preoccupied with the First Amendment, 29 TOURO L. REV. 1003, 1008–10 (2013). 
 48. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294–95 (1984); Members of 
the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984). Content neutral means 
that the regulation did not target the content of speech. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 
2218, 2227 (2015) (reinterpreting content neutral from the more traditional route followed in 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 817). 
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ner—when, where, or how—the message is communicated.49 TPM re-
strictions are only valid if “they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and . . . they leave open ample alternative channels 
for communication of the information.”50 If a TPM restriction is content 
based, however, the test will require strict scrutiny in order for the restriction 
to remain valid.51 
The relationship between the O’Brien and TPM tests is important. The 
two tests sometimes overlap. And in many circumstances, both apply.52 This 
is because TPM regulations often impose only incidental restrictions on 
speech. The two tests are also substantially similar in their treatment of con-
tent-neutral regulations. O’Brien uses “important or substantial” govern-
mental interest, and the TPM test uses “significant” governmental interest.53 
The Court has explained that there is “little, if any,” difference between these 
standards.54 
The Court applies more scrutiny to content-based restrictions. For ex-
ample, in Texas v. Johnson, the Court adjudicated a content-based restriction 
that targeted a particular message.55 There, the respondent burned a U.S. flag 
and chanted, “America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you,” at the 1984 
Republican National Convention.56 The content-based regulation prohibited 
disrespectful flag burning, but it permitted respectful burning as a method to 
dispose of a flag.57 The Court characterized this distinction as a content-
based restriction on speech.58 It required that “[a] law directed at the com-
municative nature of conduct must, like a law directed at speech itself, be 
justified by the substantial showing of need that the First Amendment re-
 
 49. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (collecting cases). 
 50. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (describing the requirements of the TPM test). The Court has 
articulated the final prong of the test in different ways. Compare U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (setting the standard as “leaves open ade-
quate alternative channels for communication”), with City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (setting the standard as “do[es] not unreasonably limit alternative 
avenues of communication”). 
 51. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. 
 52. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797–99 (1989); Clark, 468 U.S. 
at 298 & n.8. 
 53. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
 54. Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 (declining to apply O’Brien due to the substantial similarity to 
TPM). 
 55. 491 U.S. 397, 410–11 (1989). 
 56. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399. 
 57. See id. at 416–17. 
 58. Id. 
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quires.”59 Similarly, as previously mentioned, where TPM applies, a content-
based restriction will receive strict scrutiny.60 
In sum, whether a restriction targets content is an important considera-
tion for all forms of expressive speech. Once a court determines that conduct 
is expressive, it must determine whether it is content neutral. This finding 
determines the applicable level of scrutiny for the regulation. If the re-
striction is content neutral, it will receive the more deferential O’Brien and 
TPM standards. If the restriction is content based and the TPM test applies, 
that test dictates application of strict scrutiny.61 Under Johnson, a content-
based restriction will also receive an increased form of scrutiny.62 
The Supreme Court has contemplated sleeping as an expressive activity 
only once, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence.63 The case in-
volved a Department of the Interior ordinance that prohibited camping on 
National Park Service lands not specifically designated for camping.64 Pro-
testers were interested in sleeping in a tent encampment on the National 
Mall to demonstrate the difficulties of houselessness.65 The issue was wheth-
er the restriction, as applied to the protesters, violated the First Amend-
ment.66 Ultimately, the Court declined to determine whether sleeping was 
expressive conduct.67 It concluded that even if the activity was protected, the 
government regulation was a valid TPM restriction and met the O’Brien 
test.68 The restriction was content neutral because it applied to protesters 
and nonprotesters alike.69 The regulation “narrowly focuse[d] on the Gov-
ernment’s substantial interest in maintaining the parks.”70 Additionally, 
there were ample alternative channels for communication, because the Na-
tional Park Service permitted the protest group to leave its tent encampment 
in place, maintaining the group’s visual message.71 Accordingly, the Court 
held that there was no First Amendment violation.72 Importantly, the 
maintenance of the aesthetic value of public parks as a significant govern-
mental interest was essential to that holding.73 
 
 59. Id. at 406 (emphasis altered) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 
F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Clark, 468 U.S. 288). 
 60. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. 
 63. 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 64. Clark, 468 U.S. at 289–90. 
 65. Id. at 291–92. 
 66. Id. at 289. 
 67. Id. at 293. 
 68. Id. at 295, 298. 
 69. Id. at 295. 
 70. Id. at 296. 
 71. Id. at 295. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 296. 
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Clark serves as the primary guide for restrictions on public sleeping. Its 
framework was later applied to an injunction merits analysis in Metropolitan 
Council, Inc. v. Safir, an important lower court case that occurred pre-
Occupy.74 The protesters in Metropolitan Council planned to sleep on New 
York City sidewalks, taking up half the walking area, as a vigil for housing 
issues.75 Aware that the New York City Police Department strictly prohibited 
sleeping on public walkways, the protesters filed for an injunction on First 
Amendment grounds.76 The Court applied the TPM test to its merits analy-
sis and awarded injunctive relief.77 
The First Amendment cases that resulted from the Occupy movement 
created a burst of new decisions on the issue of sleeping as an expressive ac-
tivity. These cases were not resolved until as late as 2017,78 and their impact 
on First Amendment jurisprudence and social movements remains unas-
sessed. This Comment reviews the pattern of First Amendment enforce-
ment, a task only possible in retrospect. Although Occupiers removed their 
encampments from public parks eight years ago, the continued relevance is 
twofold. First, social and political movements—including the Standing Rock 
protests and the Black Lives Matter movement—continue to use similar tac-
tics.79 Second, the Occupy context provides broadly applicable insights into 
conduct-based First Amendment claims and the accessibility of speech, 
which affects all Americans. 
II.  CONTENT-DRIVEN JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT 
The Occupy cases relevant to this inquiry began when Occupy protest-
ers, facing anti-sleeping laws, asked courts to enjoin law enforcement from 
removing the Occupiers.80 Courts declined to protect the protesters’ interest 
 
 74. 99 F. Supp. 2d 438, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 75. Metropolitan Council, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 440. 
 76. Id. at 439. 
 77. Id. at 443–48. 
 78. See, e.g., Krinks v. Haslam, No. 3:12-cv-01095, 2017 WL 1857352 (M.D. Tenn. May 
9, 2017), report and recommendation accepted sub nom. Custer v. Haslam, No. 3:12-cv-01095, 
2017 WL 2591831 (M.D. Tenn. June 15, 2017). 
 79. For example, Standing Rock and Black Lives Matter used encampments as a tactic. 
At Standing Rock, this reclaiming of space challenged colonialism. Similarly, some activists for 
the Black Lives Matter movement set out to “Decolonize LA City Hall”—physically occupying 
the space in an effort to pressure Mayor Eric Garcetti to meet with them publicly. Elsewhere, 
Black Lives Matter advocates built encampments as safe, police-free environments. Much like 
Occupy, the uniting principle was creating and living in their respective desired communities. 
See Sarah Jaffe, Occupy Is Everywhere, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 6, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/
article/137512/occupy-everywhere [https://perma.cc/6AXS-GCYC]; Zach Stafford, Chicago 
Protesters Occupy Homan Square for Eighth Day to Demand Closure, GUARDIAN (Jul. 29, 2016, 
12:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/29/chicago-protestors-occupy-
homan-square-police-black-lives-matter [https://perma.cc/36JV-7A2Y]. 
 80. See, e.g., Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113, 
1119 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 
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in sleeping as an expressive activity, but they did so for different reasons and 
at various stages in the proceedings.81 
From the outset of the Occupy cases, courts across the country recog-
nized that sleeping was an expressive activity protected by the First Amend-
ment.82 After agreeing on this threshold question, the cases diverged 
considerably. They fall into three categories: (1) cases in which early success 
on sleeping claims at the temporary restraining order (TRO) stage flipped at 
the preliminary injunction stage, (2) cases that vindicated traditional First 
Amendment rights—but not sleeping claims—with preliminary injunc-
tions,83 and (3) cases that were not granted any form of relief. These catego-
ries are arranged in temporal order according to the length of time protests 
had been on the ground at the time the cases were heard. For example, alt-
hough the cases in category three ended at the earliest procedural stage, the 
cases generally commenced after the protests had been on the ground the 
longest.84 This temporal accounting is significant because the amount of 
time the encampments were standing is inversely related to the success of the 
First Amendment challenges. Importantly, the factual inquiries that the 
courts purportedly based their decisions upon—like the injunctive relief 
standard and indicia suggesting content-based regulations—do not predict 
or adequately explain the disparity in the outcomes of the cases. 
A.  Cases that Flipped85 
There were several cases in which the Occupiers won on the sleeping is-
sue at the TRO stage, but in all of these cases the courts did not grant relief at 
 
 81. Compare Watters v. Otter, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1019 (D. Idaho 2014) (granting a 
permanent injunction protecting tents), and Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. 
SUCV201104152G, 2011 WL 7460294, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2011) (granting a TRO 
protecting sleeping in the tents), with Occupy Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 1124 (dismissing 
activists’ request for a permanent injunction for failure to state a claim), and Occupy Bos. v. 
City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 24 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2011), 
https://cbsboston.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/untitled.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MYE-P3M4 
(order denying preliminary injunction). 
 82. See Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 798–99 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), 
rev’d, 769 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2014); Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d 545, 557 
(D.S.C. 2011); Occupy Fresno v. County of Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 857 (E.D. Cal. 2011); 
Freeman v. Morris, No. 11-cv-00452-NT, 2011 WL 6139216, at *5 (D. Me. Dec. 9, 2011), 
amended Dec. 12, 2011; Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 
1069 (D. Minn. 2011); Occupy Bos., 2011 WL 7460294, at *2; Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort 
Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2011). In 2011, the Middle District of Florida was 
the first to make this determination. Occupy Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 1328. 
 83. Although overlap between the first two categories is ostensibly possible, no case fell 
into both. 
 84. See infra Section II.C. 
 85. “Cases that Flipped” refers to when injunctive relief was granted at the TRO stage 
but was not granted at the preliminary injunction stage. The title rests on the idea that the 
change in a merits assessment, implicit in the decisions due to the standard for injunctive relief 
and special features of First Amendment claims for such relief, constitutes a flip. 
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the preliminary injunction stage, and the Occupiers lost their previously 
granted injunctions. The tendency to flip from granting the relief to not 
granting the relief indicates that courts were more inclined to grant TROs 
than preliminary injunctions. For example, in cases in five different cities, 
the courts initially granted TROs and later rescinded the injunctions at the 
preliminary injunction hearings.86 The cases suggest a pattern: on a nearly 
identical issue, it is easier to win on a TRO than it is to win on a preliminary 
injunction. Significantly, in the context of the cases that vindicated tradition-
al First Amendment rights and the cases without relief granted, the pattern 
holds true. Including all the cases, there are five in which TROs were grant-
ed87 and five in which TROs were denied.88 By contrast, there is one case in 
which a preliminary injunction was granted,89 and there are nine in which 
preliminary injunctions were denied.90 
The legal standards for TROs and preliminary injunctions are identical 
for First Amendment purposes. The standards consider (1) the likelihood of 
success on the merits, (2) whether irreparable harm will result without the 
injunctive relief, (3) whether the balance of equities tips in the favor of in-
junctive relief, and (4) whether an injunction is in the public interest.91 The 
distinctions between TROs and preliminary injunctions are procedural. Un-
like a preliminary injunction, a TRO—which has a shorter duration than a 
 
 86. In Occupy Boston v. City of Boston, a TRO was granted but relief was revoked a 
month later at the preliminary injunction hearing. No. 11-4152-G, at 2–3. In Isbell v. City of 
Oklahoma City and Mitchell v. City of New Haven, relief granted on TROs in 2011 ended when 
the Occupiers were denied preliminary injunctions. See Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. 
Supp. 2d 238, 241, 254 (D. Conn. 2012); Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-1423-D, 
2011 WL 6152852, at *1, *10 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2011). Similarly, in Occupy Columbia v. Ha-
ley and Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, the courts granted TROs and preliminary injunctions but 
later reversed previously granted preliminary injunctions. See Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 769 
F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2014); Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 2013); Occupy 
Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11-cv-03253-CMC, 2011 WL 6698990, at *7 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011). 
 87. See supra sources cited note 86 (listing five cases granting a TRO). 
 88. See Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114 (E.D. Cal. 
2012); Occupy Tucson v. City of Tucson, No. CV-11-699-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL 6747860 (D. 
Ariz. Dec. 22, 2011); Occupy Fresno v. County of Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 853 (E.D. Cal. 
2011); Davidovich v. City of San Diego, No. 11cv2675 WQH-NLS, 2011 WL 6013010, at *7 
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 1 2011); Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 
1069, 1071–72 (D. Minn. 2011). 
 89. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d 545, 563 (D.S.C. 2011). Occupy Nash-
ville is the only other case to enter a Preliminary Injunction on a sleeping issue, but it was by 
agreement of the parties. Occupy Nashville, 769 F.3d at 440. 
 90. See Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 254; Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825–26 
(D. Idaho 2012); Occupy Columbia, 2011 WL 6698990, at *6; Occupy Tucson, 2011 WL 6747860 
at *8; Occupy Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 865–66; Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *10; Freeman v. 
Morris, No. 11-cv-00452-NT, 2011 WL 6139216, at *12 (D. Me. Dec. 9, 2011), amended Dec. 
12, 2011; Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1338–39 (M.D. Fla. 
2011); Occupy Bos., No. 11-4152-G, at 24. 
 91. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Free Country Ltd. v. Dren-
nen, 235 F. Supp. 3d. 559, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
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preliminary injunction—is often heard ex parte and is often granted in ad-
vance of significant discovery.92 Ostensibly, a preliminary injunction is more 
difficult to win primarily because of the increased attention to the claims that 
comes with the longer amount of time it would be in place, but this distinc-
tion is diminished in the First Amendment context. 
The test for the two types of injunction is more likely to reach the same 
conclusion when there is a valid First Amendment claim. When a First 
Amendment right is at stake, “irreparable harm is ‘inseparably linked’ to the 
likelihood of success on the merits.”93 This is because the denial of a consti-
tutional right is automatically considered an irreparable harm.94 The public 
interest factor also turns on the likelihood of success on the merits, “because 
it is always in the public interest to protect constitutional rights.”95 Thus, in 
these cases, a determination on the likelihood of success on the merits 
should drive the choice to grant a TRO and a preliminary injunction alike. 
Given that courts apply the same standard, the difference in outcomes 
between TROs and preliminary injunctions is difficult to reconcile. In re-
versing earlier TROs at the preliminary injunction stage,96 courts did not re-
port shifts in the merits of the First Amendment claim.97 For example, in 
Mitchell v. City of New Haven (Occupy New Haven), the court denied the 
Occupiers’ motion for preliminary injunction on the merits.98 The court 
acknowledged that the protesters were engaged in protected speech but 
found that the city’s rules were “constitutionally acceptable, content-neutral 
restrictions.”99 The court did not indicate changes to the factual situation or 
 
 92. Free Country Ltd., 235 F. Supp. 3d. at 565; see FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)–(b). 
 93. Occupy Columbia, 866 F. Supp. at 553 (quoting WV Ass’n of Club Owners & Fra-
ternal Servs. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009)); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal 
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”); Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 
245 (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373); Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852 at *9 (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 
373); Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. SUCV201104152G, 2011 WL 7460294, at *3 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2011) (quoting Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373). 
 94. Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 545 F.3d 685, 690 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 95. Id.; Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1067 (D. 
Minn. 2011); see M Devon Moore, Note, The Preliminary Injunction Standard: Understanding 
the Public Interest Factor, 117 MICH. L. REV. 939, 957 (“Unconstitutional government actions 
are an affront to the public interest and provide an imperative in favor of granting a prelimi-
nary injunction. This . . . is driven by the interrelatedness of the merits and public interest fac-
tors.” (footnote omitted)). 
 96. See Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 241; Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *10; Occupy Bos. v. 
City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 2–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2011), 
https://cbsboston.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/untitled.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MYE-P3M4] 
(order denying preliminary injunction). 
 97. Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 241; Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *7–9. Occupy Boston is 
an exception: in reversing, the court found that the protest no longer met the threshold for 
First Amendment protection. Occupy Bos., No. 11-4152-G, at 13. 
 98. 854 F. Supp. 2d at 254. 
 99. Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 246, 254. 
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how its assessment shifted, and there was no opinion accompanying the 
TRO.100 
The flip between the TRO and preliminary injunction is similarly diffi-
cult to reconcile in Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City.101 The logic of the Isbell 
(Occupy Oklahoma City) opinion is muddled.102 The court acknowledged 
that a protected First Amendment right was at stake.103 It remarked that “[i]t 
is well-settled that ‘loss of First Amendment freedoms for even minimal pe-
riods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’ ”104 Yet, it con-
cluded that “[p]laintiffs have failed to make a sufficient showing of 
irreparable injury.’ ”105 
In Occupy Columbia v. Haley, the court flipped its ruling on a prelimi-
nary injunction after the city formally implemented new regulations.106 In 
the two temporary injunction hearings, the court considered regulations that 
were created in direct response to the Occupy movement. At the TRO stage 
and the first preliminary injunction hearing, the court deemed the regula-
tions content based as a result of that origin.107 But the formally implement-
ed regulations considered at the second preliminary injunction hearing were 
valid as TPM restrictions that served an important government interest.108 In 
other words, the court implicitly found that the formal regulations were con-
tent neutral, straying from its earlier determination.109 
Similarly, the court in Occupy Nashville v. Haslam granted injunctive re-
lief at the TRO stage and later found the new regulations valid.110 There, new 
regulations did not exist until after the TRO was granted.111 Although Occu-
piers did not contest the new regulations, the court retrospectively discussed 
the First Amendment claims, making the case instructive. To the court, the 
city had viable options to prevent the Occupiers from sleeping in the en-
campment overnight after the TRO was granted and before it enacted the 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. 2011 WL 6152852. 
 102. Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *9. 
 103. Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV–11–1423–D, 2011 WL 6016906, at *2 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 2, 2011) (“Plaintiffs have raised substantial questions about whether a viola-
tion of First Amendment rights can be shown.”). 
 104. Id. (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
 105. Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *9. 
 106. See No. 3:11–cv–03253–CMC, 2011 WL 6698990, at *7 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011) (re-
fusing to extend the preliminary injunction to the new regulations). 
 107. See Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d 545, 561 (D.S.C. 2011). 
 108. Occupy Columbia, 2011 WL 6698990, at *7. 
 109. See id. (providing the cursory explanation of a similarity to Clark). 
 110. See 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 784–85, 790 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), rev’d, 769 F.3d 434 (6th 
Cir. 2014). 
 111. Occupy Nashville, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 784–85. 
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new rules.112 Thus, Occupy Nashville exhibits the same shift as the other cases 
that flipped.113 
B.  Cases that Vindicated Traditional First Amendment Rights 
Many of the Occupy cases considered injunctive relief allowing sleep-
ing—on a theory that it is protected as expressive conduct—alongside re-
quests for relief for other First Amendment infringements.114 Some courts 
vindicated more traditional First Amendment rights, including speech ac-
tivities like parading115 and handing out leaflets. For example, the court in 
Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin determined that a TRO was in-
appropriate to protect the tent city, the protesters’ interest in sleeping at the 
encampment overnight, and the protesters’ interest in writing with chalk on 
the plaza.116 Instead, the court granted a TRO to protect protesters’ interest 
in using signage.117 In Occupy Fort Myers, the court declined to protect pro-
testers’ interest in sleeping, protesting for twenty-four hours, or maintaining 
their tent city;118 however, the court enjoined enforcement of a permitting 
preference that favored “civil events.”119 The court in Occupy Fresno v. Coun-
ty of Fresno considered and denied preliminary injunctions for sleeping and 
staying in the park overnight but granted a preliminary injunction to protect 
the distribution of handbills.120 In Watters v. Otter (Occupy Boise), protest-
ers’ interests in writing with chalk and sleeping at the park were not protect-
ed, yet the court eliminated a permitting provision that gave preference to 
state-sponsored events.121 
 
 112. Id. at 800. 
 113. See Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 241, 254 (D. Conn. 2012) 
(denying a preliminary injunction protecting the tent city after having granted a TRO); Isbell v. 
City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV–11–1423–D, 2011 WL 6152852, at *1, *10 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 
12, 2011) (same); Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 2–3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 
7, 2011), https://cbsboston.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/untitled.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MYE-
P3M4] (order denying preliminary injunction); supra text accompanying notes 106–109. 
 114. See Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831 (D. Idaho 2012); Occupy Minneapolis 
v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1069 (D. Minn. 2011); Occupy Fort Myers v. 
City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2011). 
 115. Although the Supreme Court called parading the “most pristine and classical form” 
of First Amendment rights, the Court has also called it “mob law.” Magid, supra note 33, at 
475. 
 116. 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1070–71. 
 117. Occupy Minneapolis, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1070, 1072. 
 118. Occupy Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 1331–32, 1334–36. 
 119. The court also enjoined parading, due to extraneous circumstances. Id. at 1332–36. 
 120. 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 863–67, 870 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
 121. Watters v. Otter, 26 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1019 (D. Idaho 2014); Watters v. Otter, 986 F. 
Supp. 2d 1162, 1176 (D. Idaho 2013). Watters had the best outcome for protesters. The court 
entered a permanent injunction that protected the encampment and allowed protestors to re-
main there for twenty-four hours (but not to sleep in the encampment). Watters, 26 F. Supp. 
3d at 1018–19. 
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This category of cases illustrates a huge variation in how courts deter-
mine whether a regulation is content based. The standards appear even more 
diverse across the Occupy movement.122 Except for Occupy Fresno,123 each 
court produced conclusions about whether the restriction on each activity, 
or sub-issue, was content based, rather than determining if the regulation 
overall was content based.124 Injunctive relief turned on whether the regula-
tion of a particular activity was content neutral. Relief was denied if the sub-
issue regulation was content neutral; relief was granted if it was content 
based.125 This was not true for the other categories of cases, where the con-
tent determination did not vary by speech activity sub-issues or procedural 
stages.126 
In Occupy Minneapolis, the ban on signage was deemed content based 
because it only allowed display of state-endorsed signs, implying preferential 
treatment for endorsed content.127 The court’s standard looked only to the 
terms of the ordinance.128 Since a government official administering the reg-
ulation “must ‘examine the content of . . . signs to determine whether the 
 
 122. In some cases, the court did not ask if the regulation was content based or content 
neutral. See, e.g., Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Occupy 
Bos. v. City of Boston, No. SUCV201104152G, 2011 WL 7460294 (Mass. Super Ct. Nov. 17, 
2011). In Mitchell v. City of New Haven, the court assessed enforcement of the regulation in 
practice to determine if it was content based. 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251 (D. Conn. 2012). In Oc-
cupy Eugene v. United States General Services Administration, the court found the regulation 
content neutral, despite the fact that the regulation overtly stated its purpose was to enable re-
moval of Occupiers. 43 F. Supp. 3d 1143, 1150 (D. Or. 2014). 
 123. See Occupy Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 857–58. 
 124. Watters, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 
F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071 (D. Minn. 2011); Occupy Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 1335. 
 125. See Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp. 2d 823 (D. Idaho 2012) (finding Boise’s anti-
sleeping ban content neutral but its anti-tent and protester removal policies content based); 
Occupy Minneapolis, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1070–71 (finding regulations that ban signs content 
based but anti-camping rules and anti-chalking rules content neutral); Occupy Fort Myers, 882 
F. Supp. 2d at 1335 (finding the permitting regulations content based). 
 126. No other set of cases varies in its determinations about content targeting according 
to the type of activity regulated (sub-issue). No other cases vary in between, for example, the 
TRO and preliminary injunction hearings (procedural stage). See Occupy Sacramento v. City 
of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (finding regulations as a whole 
content neutral); Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 245; Occupy Tucson v. City of Tucson, No. CV-
11-699-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL 6747860, at *7–8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2011) (finding the permit pro-
vision content-neutral); Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-1423-D, 2011 WL 
6152852, at *8 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2011) (finding curfew enforcement and the camping ban 
content-neutral); Davidovich v. City of San Diego, No. 11cv2675 WQH-NLS, 2011 WL 
6013010, (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011) (providing a broad treatment of the regulations as a whole). 
But see Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 922 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528–30 (D.S.C. 2013) (discussing the 
change in views on content neutrality between the first and second preliminary injunction or-
ders). 
 127. Occupy Minneapolis, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 
 128. Id. 
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[Resolution] applies,’ ” it is content based.129 Here, the terms of the ordi-
nance included consideration for the implied terms that administering the 
rule as written involved.130 
Similarly, in Occupy Fort Myers, the preference provided to civic events 
on the plaza was deemed content based because it “require[d] the recreation 
manager to examine the nature of the activity in making a decision to extend 
park hours.”131 The court applied an “on the terms of the regulation” stand-
ard.132 Much like in Occupy Minneapolis,133 the court applied the standard 
loosely.134 The same standard used elsewhere can mean a textual approach 
that requires the statute to directly limit the advancement of specific ideas to 
find content targeting.135 
In Watters v. Otter (Occupy Boise), the court found that the anti-
camping ordinance was content based.136 The ordinance was not formally 
enacted, and it was unenforced before Occupy.137 The court inferred selec-
tive enforcement, finding that the informal rule was only ever enforced 
against Occupy.138 The city implemented formal rules after the TRO hearing 
and before the preliminary injunction hearing.139 The same court assessed 
the unwritten rules and later the formal rule. Yet after rules were formally 
implemented in response to the court’s TRO decision, the court found the 
formal rules content neutral.140 On review, the district court articulated crite-
ria different from those in its TRO decision. It deemed regulation content 
based if it described speech content on its face, distinguished favored speech 
from disfavored, or required law enforcement to examine the content of the 
message.141 This rationale abandoned the key criterion that drove the prior 
 
 129. Id. (quoting Desert Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814 
(9th Cir. 1996)). 
 130. Id. The case has another inconsistency. For the anti-sleeping ordinance, since “[t]he 
Court [could not] perceive a reason not to apply Clark,” it concluded the regulation was valid, 
implying a finding of content neutrality without assessing the terms of the anti-sleeping statue. 
Id. 
 131. Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1335 (M.D. Fla. 
2011). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text. 
 134. Compare Occupy Eugene v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1143, 1149 (D. 
Or. 2014) (considering overt appearance of political ideas only), with Occupy Fort Myers, 882 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1335 (considering implications of the facial text). 
 135. See, e.g., Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251 (D. Conn. 2012). 
 136. 854 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (D. Idaho 2012). 
 137. Watters, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 826. 
 138. Id. at 829. 
 139. Watters v. Otter, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1170 (D. Idaho 2013). 
 140. Watters v. Otter, 955 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1187 (D. Idaho 2013). 
 141. See id. 
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decision: it no longer recognized explicit targeting of the Occupy movement 
as a sufficient reason to find the regulations content based.142 
The cases that vindicated other First Amendment rights reflect uneven 
adjudication of whether or not the regulation was content based. The courts 
applied standards inconsistently, which is made evident not only by compar-
ing the different standards but also by contrasting the internal logic of the 
same court at different procedural stages. This demonstrates that the test for 
content targeting may be vulnerable to unintentional manipulation, altering 
the level of scrutiny required for governmental regulations. 
C.  Cases Without Relief Granted 
In the Occupy cases without relief granted, no form of relief was granted 
whatsoever at any stage of the proceedings. This category of cases similarly 
displays the previously discussed trends—but in these cases the courts quick-
ly dismissed the First Amendment claim. The courts all either applied a con-
tent-neutral frame143 or did not make any content-targeting 
determination.144 
In some cases, courts articulated a circular rationale. Injunctive relief 
was not justified because injunctions should only maintain the status quo, 
and the ordinance enforcement established the status quo. Thus, the courts 
dismissed the cases based on either the plaintiffs’ failure to plead the status 
quo or the fact that the ordinance was enforced prior to Occupy.145 The 
quick dismissal of claims is most evident in Occupy Sacramento v. Sacramen-
to and Occupy Pensacola v. City of Pensacola.146 In both, the cities won on 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.147 
All of the cases in this category took place in cities with relatively high 
populations of houseless people, anti-sleeping laws, and regular enforcement 
of those laws before Occupy started.148 Thus, courts upheld these ordinances 
without hesitation because formal regulations excluding houseless people 
were already a frequently enforced part of the criminal law, despite conflict 
with recognized First Amendment interests. Furthermore, on average, these 
cases commenced long after the cases in the other categories, often after they 
 
 142. See id. at 1186–87. 
 143. See, e.g., Davidovich v. City of San Diego, No. 11cv2675 WQH-NLS, 2011 WL 
6013010, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011). 
 144. See, e.g., Occupy Tucson v. City of Tucson, No. CV-11-699-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL 
6747860, at *7–8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2011). 
 145. See, e.g., id. at *7. 
 146. Occupy Pensacola v. City of Pensacola, 569 F. App’x 745, 752 (11th Cir. 2014); Oc-
cupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 147. Occupy Pensacola, 569 F. App’x at 753; Occupy Sacramento, 878 F.2d 1110. 
 148. See U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 2011 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 8–9, 16 (2012). 
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had TRO and preliminary injunction hearings.149 These cases are in stark 
contrast to the sleeping claims in the cases that flipped, where the TRO hear-
ings took place when the encampments were newly set up.150 Accordingly, 
the cases illustrate a negative correlation between success gaining injunctive 
relief and the amount of time the protests were on the ground. 
The Occupy cases demonstrate odd trends in judicial enforcement. The 
cases that flipped reveal a preference for TRO claims over preliminary in-
junctions and suggest the eroding willingness of courts to find likelihood of 
success on the merits over time. In addition, the cases that validated tradi-
tional First Amendment protesters’ claims illustrate judicial disapproval of 
expressive sleeping activity. As this Comment illustrates in Part III, the pres-
ence of visual signs of houselessness at the protests may better explain these 
trends. 
III.  EXCLUDING ACCESSIBLE SPEECH 
Judicial interest in policing the aesthetics of public space is a viable ex-
planation for the pattern of enforcement identified in Part II. Section III.A 
reexamines the Occupy decisions and suggests that policing the appearance 
of houselessness is an alternative explanation for the pattern of judicial en-
forcement. Section III.B explains the harm involved in policing aesthetics 
where speech content is also implicated. 
A.  Judicial Enforcement and Aesthetic Policing 
The blending of broken windows laws and the First Amendment pro-
vides a compelling explanation for what may have animated the pattern of 
judicial enforcement. This has sinister implications: it suggests the further 
rollback of rights for people without resources, this time in the arena of ex-
pression. Courts did not adequately explain why some cases flipped, winning 
TROs but not preliminary injunctions.151 Government policing of aesthetics 
provides a persuasive alternative explanation for the change in outcomes. In 
each case, the visual disorder in the encampments increased between the 
TRO and preliminary injunction stages. Such visual disorder is commonly 
associated with houselessness.152 
 
 149. Compare Occupy Pensacola, 569 F. App’x at 746–47, with Occupy Fort Myers v. City 
of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2011). 
 150. Compare Occupy Pensacola, 569 F. App’x at 747, with Occupy Fort Myers, 882 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1324–25. 
 151. See supra Section II.A. 
 152. Compare Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 786–87, 800 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2013) (describing “urinating and defecating” around the encampment and interactions 
between houseless persons and protesters), and Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-
1423-D, 2011 WL 6152852, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2011) (describing “deteriorating condi-
tions and a stench” in the protest space), with Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1151–
52 (Cal. 1995) (detailing actions by the city to remove a tent city of houseless persons). 
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In Occupy Boston v. City of Boston and Occupy Columbia, the protests 
grew larger over time.153 Interestingly, there was also a change in tone when 
the judges discussed the situations at the respective camps. In granting each 
TRO, the judges noted mitigating factors, describing protesters and their 
camps as well kept.154 For example, the Occupy Boston court noted that “par-
ticipants [had] worked with the Boston Fire Marshal to ensure that the struc-
ture of the occupation [met] fire regulations.”155 Similarly, in Occupy 
Columbia, the court noted that protesters “work[ed] with the horticulturist 
who maintain[ed] the grounds to minimize [the protest’s] impact on the 
lawn.”156 In contrast, the decisions denying the preliminary injunctions 
painted a picture of disorderly camps. The Occupy Boston court began by 
emphasizing that occupation is not speech as a matter of law.157 The protest 
had always included the claim that its message “can only be effectively com-
municated through the ‘literal occupation of Boston.’ ”158 The court de-
scribed the visual appearance of the encampment at length, in disapproving 
terms: “[T]ents are set cheek-to-jowl with stakes, guy ropes, and space only 
for three walkways.”159 It also proclaimed that “[t]he density of people occu-
pying one-quarter acre of land is extraordinary.”160 
In Occupy Columbia, the governor became involved because she was 
concerned about the aesthetic damage of the protest group appearing along-
side her holiday tree-lighting ceremony.161 Although the court did not view 
the tree-lighting ceremony as a valid reason to remove the group,162 it did 
allow the state to justify removing protesters because of worries about 
“crime” and public health.163 
 
 153. See Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 
2011), https://cbsboston.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/untitled.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MYE-
P3M4] (“More tents and protesters have joined the group.”); Brian McConchie, Occupy De-
monstrators Arrested at State House, WACH FOX57 (Nov. 16, 2011, 8:41 PM), 
https://wach.com/news/local/occupy-demonstrators-arrested-at-state-house [https://perma.cc/
QS6M-PK4V] (“The group has been rallying at the State House since October 15, usually in 
crowds of several dozen.”). 
 154. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d 545, 549 (D.S.C. 2011); Occupy Bos. v. 
City of Boston, No. SUCV201104152G, 2011 WL 7460294, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 
2011). 
 155. Occupy Bos., 2011 WL 7460294, at *4. 
 156. Occupy Columbia, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 549. 
 157. Occupy Bos., No. 11-4152-G, at 2. 
 158. Id. at 11. 
 159. Id. at 5. 
 160. Id. at 6. 
 161. See Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 922 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527–28 (D.S.C. 2013). The gov-
ernor took action only after receiving a letter from a state senator noting that the protest would 
make the tree lighting less “pleasant.” That same day, the governor ordered the protesters re-
moved. In an open letter, she noted damage to the statehouse property. Id. 
 162. Id. at 535. 
 163. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11–cv–03253–CMC, 2011 WL 6698990, at *5–6 
(D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011). 
1526 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 117:1507 
In Isbell (Occupy Oklahoma City) and Occupy Nashville, the increase in 
houseless participation is essential to understanding why the courts did not 
grant preliminary injunctions.164 Unlike the situations in Boston and Co-
lumbia, in Oklahoma City,165 the number of protesters decreased over 
time.166 At the preliminary injunction stage,167 unoccupied tents were de-
scribed as “an open invitation for homeless persons unaffiliated with the 
group.”168 The court described the people remaining as “mainly transients or 
others who were causing disturbances and safety issues.”169 This highlights a 
key assumption: that houselessness and protesting were mutually exclusive. 
The city bluntly worried that the camp had become “aesthetically damag-
ing,” and the court validated that view.170 Professor Marc L. Roark contends 
that the visual representation of Occupy Oklahoma City’s message was 
“condoned and accepted so long as they were not actually representative of 
poor and homeless people, but rather were merely symbolic.”171 That is, the 
speech was only legitimate when it was done on behalf of houseless people, 
and it lost legitimacy once the houseless people themselves participated. 
As in Oklahoma City, the judge in Occupy Nashville was uncomfortable 
with the number of houseless people in the plaza.172 The judge attributed 
negative features of the protest to the houseless people alone, quoting exten-
sively in the opinion to the plaza’s Facilities Administrator, who stated that 
“protesters have lost control of the situation with the homeless and the envi-
ronment has become unsanitary and unsafe.”173 Under this view, the pres-
ence of the houseless people delegitimized the expressive activity and 
transformed the entire group into a public nuisance.174 After houseless peo-
ple began to utilize the camp as a living space, the encampment was re-
moved.175 
 
 164. See Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 786 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Isbell 
v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-1423-D, 2011 WL 6152852, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 
2011); Roark, supra note 18, at 61–63. 
 165. See also supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 166. Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *6 (“[T]he number of protestors dwindled . . . .”). 
 167. The same judge issued the divergent rulings at the TRO and preliminary injunction 
stages. See Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *1; Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-1423-D, 
2011 WL 6016906, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 2, 2011). 
 168. Isbell, 2011 WL 6152852, at *6. 
 169. The court attributes this view to the protester who previously held the protest per-
mit. Id. 
 170. Id. at *6, *8. 
 171. Roark, supra note 18, at 62. 
 172. Occupy Nashville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 786–87 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), rev’d, 
769 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 173. Id. at 787. 
 174. See Roark, supra note 18, at 62. 
 175. See Tim Ghianni, Police Arrest 29 Occupy Nashville Protesters at Capitol Plaza, 
REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2011, 12:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tennessee-occupy-
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More information about the context of Occupy Nashville demonstrates a 
connection between the use of anti-sleeping ordinances to remove houseless 
people and the removal of Occupy protesters.176 One year before the start of 
Occupy, the governor urged the Department of Government Services to cre-
ate a regulation to diminish the number of houseless people sleeping at the 
plaza overnight.177 By the time the protest started, the anti-sleeping rules 
were not yet enacted. Therefore, the regulations that made it impossible for 
Occupy to continue were designed to target houseless people from the start. 
In the Occupy Nashville opinion, the court stated that “[s]omething needed 
to be done to preserve the physical integrity of the Plaza, to reduce or elimi-
nate crime taking place there.”178 The court’s reasoning bears an uncanny 
resemblance to broken windows theory.179 The Nashville judge viewed the 
appearance of the protest as a blemish on an otherwise orderly space and 
thought the disorder created a potential site for criminal activity.180 
Commenting on Occupy Nashville, Professor Roark explained an irony: 
“[T]he identity of the occupy group shifted from protester to public nui-
sance. Thus, the occupants of the Plaza were aligned with the negative fea-
tures of vandalism, public urination, indecent exposure, and the like through 
the import of a new rule and a broader collective judgment on the space.”181 
He suggests that it was not just the existence of the houseless people, who 
were there all along, but that fact combined with the promulgation of new 
anti-camping rules that drove the change.182 The new rules codified that it is 
criminal to sleep in the park. In so doing, they affirmed that the people sleep-
ing in the park were not stakeholders engaged in valid park use but were the 
criminal “other.”183 Thus, the new rules created a legal hook for many, in-
cluding the judge who adjudicated the case, to vindicate the existing goal of 
diminishing the appearance of houselessness in public.184 
Mitchell (Occupy New Haven) is difficult to assess because the TRO did 
not have an associated opinion.185 The opinion denying the preliminary in-




 176. Occupy Nashville, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 786–88. 
 177. Id. at 786. 
 178. Id. at 800. 
 179. See supra Section I.A. 
 180. Compare Occupy Nashville, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 800, with Amster, supra note 21, at 
200 (“For at least six centuries, homelessness has been associated with ‘disorder’ and ‘crimi-
nality’. . . .”). 
 181. Roark, supra note 18, at 62. 
 182. Id. at 62, 74. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. at 61–62, 66, 73–80. 
 185. Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238 (D. Conn. 2012). 
 186. Id. at 253. 
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thing unsatisfying about telling a movement that aims to make visible an of-
ten unseen, ignored population that it should content itself with forms of 
communication that are only seen when someone seeks them out.”187 It 
touched on the central oddity in all cases that flipped. The courts previously 
acknowledged the expressive value of sleeping but later removed protection, 
unanimously citing interest in maintaining the aesthetics of the parks as an 
important governmental interest.188 Thus, they saw the speech’s value but 
were uncomfortable with the conduct’s visual impact.189 
The decisions in the cases that flipped replicated the underlying policy 
goals of the criminal exclusion of houseless people in the First Amendment 
context. In the Occupy cases, dehumanizing houseless people also denied 
several rights not ordinarily at stake with anti-sleeping laws.190 Houseless 
people were participating in recognized First Amendment protected speech, 
and the injunction hearings turned on the likelihood of success on the merits 
of the First Amendment claim. The determination that the restriction on 
speech was valid—despite treading on individual free speech rights—was 
based on aesthetic interests. Accordingly, the choice not to protect protesters 
embedded a value judgment based on what the protesters and their space 
looked like. The same population that was targeted for exclusion from using 
public space was silenced. This is a high price to pay to protect a governmen-
tal interest in uninterrupted lawn care.191 
The second category of cases, cases that vindicated traditional First 
Amendment rights, also featured an odd pattern. Those cases may be ex-
plained by courts’ discomfort with expression perceived to have a lasting 
disorderly impact and courts’ comfort in vindicating nonvisual, evanescent 
forms of communication. Unsuccessful claims correlate with the content-
neutral determinations assigned to activities that left a lasting visual impact 
on the space. In contrast, successful claims correlate almost exclusively with 
content-based determinations awarded to activities that did not leave a last-
ing visual impact on the space.192 The pattern likely served to reinforce the 
validity of the exclusion of houseless people from public spaces. 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 114 n.4 (4th Cir. 2013); Occupy Nash-
ville v. Haslam, 949 F. Supp. 2d 777, 800 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 250; 
Isbell v. City of Oklahoma City., No. CIV-11-1423-D, 2011 WL 6152852, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 
12, 2011); Occupy Bos. v. City of Boston, No. 11-4152-G, at 5, 18–19 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 
2011), https://cbsboston.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/untitled.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MYE-
P3M4] (order denying preliminary injunction). 
 189. See, e.g., Occupy Bos., No. 11-4152-G, at 5, 18–19. 
 190. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 176–178. 
 191. See, e.g., Watters v. Otter, 986 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1175 (D. Idaho 2013) (validating the 
state’s justification of lawn care for removing the Occupy Boise encampment); see also Timo-
thy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439, 475 
(2006) (detailing New York City’s attempt to prohibit protests in Central Park due to lawn 
preservation). 
 192. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
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In Watters (Occupy Boise), Occupy Fort Myers, Occupy Minneapolis, and 
Occupy Fresno, the courts only protected speech with low visual impact. 
They protected displaying handheld signs, distributing handbills, and parad-
ing.193 Unlike sleeping in tent encampments, which necessitated an ongoing 
and visible presence, the protected activities did not change the park’s ap-
pearance.194 The courts overtly discussed aesthetic interests. For example, the 
Fresno court credited the government’s argument that the laws already in 
place “maintained[ed] Courthouse Park in aesthetically pleasing and sanitary 
conditions for the benefit of all park users.”195 The Fresno court likely drew a 
parallel between the format of the protest and the already infamous tent en-
campments,196 commonly erected by houseless residents for survival and a 
familiar sight in Fresno long before Occupy began.197 Crucially, classic forms 
of First Amendment speech interests—for example, a published writing, a 
speech, or a parade—leave only a subtle or fleeting visual. 
Oddly, Watters (Occupy Boise) and Occupy Minneapolis both rejected 
protesters’ interests in writing in chalk as a form of expression.198 Chalk is 
not permanent; nonetheless, courts made clear that they viewed it as an ac-
tivity with a high visual impact. Watters is paradigmatic of how the camps 
were associated with blight, due to the visual impact of speech. In Watters, 
the court explained that anti-chalking rules are valid TPM restrictions, be-
cause the government has a substantial interest in “controlling the aesthetic 
appearance” of its facilities.199 It noted that aesthetic interest is also a legiti-
mate reason to proscribe “unpleasant formats for expression.”200 Further-
more, it said that “the substantive evil—visual blight—is not merely a 
possible byproduct” but an inherent result of use of “the medium”—chalk.201 
The opinion makes a false equivalence between chalk and painted graffiti. 
 
 193. Watters, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1172; Occupy Fresno v. County of Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 
2d 849, 869 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Occupy Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 
1062, 1072 (D. Minn. 2011); Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 
1333–34 (M.D. Fla. 2011); see supra Section II.B. 
 194. See Occupy Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 864; see supra Section II.B. 
 195. Occupy Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d at 871. 
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2011, 12:17 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2011/10/28/occupy-fresno-stalls-clearing-of-
homeless-camp/ [https://perma.cc/Z838-JXPT]. 
 198. Watters, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1169; Occupy Minneapolis, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. This 
was, of course, in addition to the rejection of sleeping interests. Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp. 
2d 823, 831 (D. Idaho 2012); Occupy Minneapolis, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 
 199. Watters, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1173. 
 200. Id. at 1174 (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 
789, 806 (1984)). 
 201. Id. (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 
806 (1984)). 
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Vilification of graffiti is common to broken windows policing,202 which ima-
gines vandalism as a symptom of untended property, threatening a break-
down of control.203 The court stated that “even temporary blight” may be 
removed; accordingly, it made no difference that chalk washes away in the 
rain.204 This presents an exaggerated account of the state’s aesthetic interests. 
Professor Timothy Zick explains that leaving a mark on physical space, 
such as drawing in chalk, is communicative under a rubric of legal geogra-
phy.205 He uses the term “inscription” for the act of conveying an idea or ex-
perience by writing on the physical space, noting that restrictions on 
inscription “are often justified as necessary to prevent visual blight.”206 Zick 
argues that it is essential to realize that restrictions on inscription “eliminate 
cheap and efficient methods of writing in spaces frequented by the public.”207 
Moreover, he alleges that restrictions on inscriptions “define not only norms 
of community aesthetics, but proper communicative methods as well.”208 
The law is open to considerable discretion in deciding what is content 
neutral.209 Alarmingly, governmental aesthetic controls in the guise of con-
tent-neutral restrictions engender less scrutiny.210 The label obscures the cost 
to houseless persons’ speech. Thus, there is a high risk that courts’ uncon-
scious manipulation of the content-targeting test replicates preexisting pow-
er relationships. By prioritizing an orderly aesthetic for public parks, courts 
pushed houseless, unsheltered people out of view, excluding them from ex-
pressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. 
The final category of cases, those that were not granted any form of re-
lief, also featured visually based considerations. These cases featured the 
same justification: the need to clear the protest from the space to make way 
for other uses.211 For example, in Davidovich v. City of San Diego the court 
 
 202. Jenny E. Carroll, Graffiti, Speech, and Crime, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1285, 1306 (2019). 
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(D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2011); Freeman v. Morris, No. 11-cv-00452-NT, 2011 WL 6139216, at *12 
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explained that the municipal code that banned sleeping in the park “serve[d] 
significant government interests in . . . ensuring that the public space is free 
of obstructions and is available for the use and enjoyment of members of the 
public.”212 This frequently provided justification is not unique to the cases 
without any relief granted.213 
The court in Freeman v. Morris (Occupy Augusta) took the logic of 
making way for other uses one step further. The court explained that the 
protest could not remain because it would suppress the free speech of hypo-
thetical future protests that would ostensibly be vying for the same space and 
unable to coexist.214 This is problematic; it automatically placed the interests 
of hypothetical future groups over ongoing speech based only on the format 
the speech took. 
The court in Freeman acted as though the movement was only per-
formative and its form coincidental, parallel to the empty words used in fili-
bustering.215 The explicit purpose of a filibuster is the exclusion of other 
speech to force a particular conversation.216 Occupy did aspire to transform 
the discussion around politics; however, its expression did not come at the 
cost of excluding other speech. More importantly, the conduct itself engaged 
in a political conversation. The form itself was full of meaning, unlike speech 
in a filibuster. The confusion was made possible by the content-neutral 
frame, used in all the cases without relief.217 The threshold test that deter-
mines if the First Amendment applies “only helps determine whether the act 
is indeed expressive rather than merely functional.”218 The next step in adju-
dication is a check for content targeting, which treats expressive conduct no 
differently from spoken or written words.219 When the act, like sleeping, can 
be merely functional, it is likely that regulations of general application aimed 
at the act will also appear content neutral.220 
 
 212. Davidovich, 2011 WL 6013010, at *4. 
 213. See, e.g., Occupy Fresno v. County of Fresno, 835 F. Supp. 2d 849, 859 (E.D. Cal. 
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The purported justification that exclusion of houseless persons is neces-
sary to make way for other public uses is also often advanced in broken win-
dows campaigns to justify anti-sleeping rules.221 The idea is that the law 
applies equally to unsheltered and sheltered persons.222 But the rules trans-
form public spaces into liminal areas that merely reinforce neighboring pub-
lic property rights at the expense of unsheltered persons whom the 
regulations disenfranchise.223 And there are additional repercussions in the 
realm of the First Amendment. The perceived visual disorder likely delegiti-
mized the twenty-four-hour protest as a form of speech. Mark Bray, one of 
the founders of Occupy New York, explained this disparity in speech rights. 
In discussing negative media portrayals of the movement, he contended that 
“elites can go through the front door, while the back door is ‘designed for the 
poorer actors and the entrance fee is often paid for in (what could be labeled) 
the “dues of disorder.” ’ ”224 The same laws that disenfranchise people also 
disenfranchise speech about their interests.225 The Freeman decision exem-
plifies this; the court reasoned that any other kind of speech that might take 
place in the future is more valuable than Occupy’s current speech due solely 
to the movement’s twenty-four-hour protest format.226 
B. Silencing Houseless Speech 
The selective protection of First Amendment rights based on aesthetics 
is far from benign. There is an essential connection between the Occupy 
movement’s message and the unprotected conduct. The movement’s inclu-
sion of houseless populations and its efforts to speak to issues related to in-
digence fused content and expressive conduct. Declining to protect 
Occupiers’ use of sleeping as expressive conduct fortified the systematic ex-
clusion of speech by and about houseless people in public spaces. 
The Occupy movement’s political message is relevant to issues of house-
lessness. The movement, designed as a nonhierarchical, consensus-based or-
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ganization,227 is multi-vocal.228 An all-local-movements articulation of Oc-
cupy’s goals would have aspired to address the failure of our representative 
government and the problem of income inequality.229 Protesters involved in 
the First Amendment cases believed that the symbolic content of sleeping in 
the tent encampments made the connection between Occupy and houseless-
ness issues overt.230 For example, in Mitchell (Occupy New Haven), protest-
ers explained that the encampment served as “a tangible reminder of the 
reality of homelessness and the hardship of poverty, facts often swept out of 
sight . . . in urban areas.”231 
Above symbolism, the Occupy protest format was designed to include 
indigent people. As Mark Bray explained, “ ‘we don’t have demands; we are 
the demand.’ In other words [Occupy Wall Street] was embodying the world 
it desired.”232 This idea permeated the local Occupy groups involved in the 
First Amendment cases. For example, in Occupy Boston an Occupy advocate 
explained that “more perfect democracy can only be effectively communicat-
ed through the ‘literal occupation’ . . . . [T]he occupation is the message.”233 
Similarly, nearly all the other local Occupy groups articulated the goal of 
embodying a more egalitarian world.234 The inclusion of all interested per-
sons was not just a feature of the movement but also a core tenet of the con-
tent of the speech. The overlap in the conduct the movement sought to 
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protect and the content of its speech was not a lucky accident but the inten-
tional marriage of action and plan.235 
Unfortunately, the inclusion of houseless people also subjected each lo-
cal movement to courts’ inability to consider the bond between conduct and 
content.236 Occupy’s inclusive agenda drove the conduct-based speech. The 
courts recognized the speech, but the content-driven scrutiny determination 
could not account for conduct as content.237 
In order to be visible and inclusive, the protests had only one option: the 
traditional public forum. Although public fora enjoy the most First Amend-
ment protection, the same spaces are regulated by criminal law, which often 
criminalizes houseless persons.238 The convergence of these two problems 
produced the ultimate failure of all Occupy First Amendment challenges 
and, troublingly, the exclusion of houseless persons’ speech from public fora. 
As houseless, unsheltered people are likely in a position where the public fo-
rum is the only venue ostensibly available, the issue is significant.239 Moreo-
ver, as the Occupy cases demonstrate, current jurisprudence weighs heavily 
against groups interested in speaking about issues related to houselessness.240 
The result is systemic failure to appropriately protect speech by and about 
houseless people. 
Policing the content of speech based on the income or the appearance of 
the speaker is categorically unacceptable. The judicial system must treat 
symbolic speech carefully. Expressive conduct “has been called ‘the poor 
man’s printing press’ because for many people without the power, prestige, 
and financial resources . . . action is the only way to effectively convey their 
views to a wide group of people.”241 Ironically, the Supreme Court created 
the content-targeting assessment to avoid the danger of message- and speak-
er-based bias. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has argued that the adjudication of expressive conduct in 
cases that challenged anti-sleeping ordinances raises concerns about the ac-
cessibility of expression. The Occupy movement cases that initially granted 
injunctive relief removed protections after an increase in visual indicia of 
houselessness. Other cases illustrated a preference for classic First Amend-
ment rights, which left no trace in the public park, over the accessible speech 
interests in camping and sleeping. And when rules criminalizing houseless-
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ness were already well enforced, courts were most willing to swiftly dismiss 
First Amendment challenges. Together, the Occupy cases illustrated the sys-
tematic exclusion of conduct-based expression by and about houseless peo-
ple. 
There is a deep tension in the concept of removing houseless people to 
keep public spaces aesthetically pleasing for public use. Advocates of beauty 
at the cost of excluding houseless persons are often motivated by promoting 
property rights:242 people with property adjacent to public spaces are the 
beneficiaries of the strict rules that impose exclusion.243 Moreover, the gov-
ernment’s interest is often aligned with tighter control over public spaces.244 
Against this backdrop, houseless people in public spaces are not invaders, 
but they are the “canary in the coalmine—the immediate victims of its colo-
nization.”245 The Occupy movement’s speech interests were aligned with ac-
cessibility. Despite the movement’s name, Occupy may have been not the 
colonizer but the canary. 
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